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Predmet rada predstavljaju osnovna pitanja koja se u srpskom pravu i poslovnoj praksi postavljaju u kontekstu odgovornosti direktora za štetu koju prouzrokuje društvu. U tom smislu, u radu su analizirana pravila Zakona o privrednim društvima kojima se utvrđuju posebne dužnosti direktora prema društvu -dužnost pažnje u izvršavanju poslova s jedne strane i skup dužnosti koje se smatraju dužnostima lojalnosti prema društvu s druge strane. U nastojanju pružanja celovite slike o pitanjima koja odgovornost direktora može pokrenuti, pomenuta pravila su analizirana kako sa aspekta konkretnih pravila Zakona o privrednim društvima tako
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TSG Tomic Sindjelic Groza Law office Belgrade directOr'S liaBilitY fOr daMage he cauSeS tO the cOMPanY* Odgovornost direktora za štetu koju prouzrokuje društvu suited to the requirements and specific nature of this type of contractual relations. In comparison with the general rules applicable to civil-law contracts, the rules governing commercial contracts entail greater liability, shorter deadlines and stricter remedies. 6 As regards the liability for performance, the Law provides that a party to an obligation relation is bound to act with the care which is required in legal transactions in a given type of obligation relations (care of a prudent businessman, or care of bonus pater familias). 7 In this way, the Law, whilst defining the general rule of conduct in performance of duties, establishes different standards, depending on the type of the specific obligation relation. These standards imply a lesser or higher level of care as the criterion for liability of the obligor who, in performance of his duties, failed to implement the care required of him in the given type of contractual relation. 8 In each case, the care is evaluated based on the type of person who acts normally with respect to his abilities, knowledge and skills, whilst also taking into account what is typically expected from such person in a specific type of contractual relations. The Law has established objective care as the standard, which means that the individual properties of contractual parties are not deemed to be of significance. In this regard, the parties to civil-law contracts are required, in performing their contractual obligations, to act with the care of a bonus pater familias (reasonable person). The care of a reasonable person implies a person who acts reasonably and with due care in performing his tasks, managing property and fulfilling his obligations towards other persons. On the other hand, when an obligation relation stems from business activities of the parties to legal transactions, they are required to act with the care of a prudent businessman, i.e. the care required in business transactions. In addition to the standard care of a reasonable person and a prudent businessman, the Law also provides for the care of a prudent expert, which implies stricter, expert and professional care in performance of contractual obligations. Under the Law, a party to an obligation relation is required to act with greater care in performance of tasks which fall within the domain of his vocation, in accordance with the rules and practices of profession (the care of a prudent expert). 9 This is a special professional care, required of professionals pursuing a certain line of business. The assessment of this type of care is based above all on the rules of a given profession and fair business practices which are employed in a given professional field, and applicable in performance of a given professional activity. 10 From the standpoint of general rules of the Law on Obligations, the above rules pertaining to due care bear special relevance for deciding the issue of liability for failure to perform a contractual obligation. In this context, it is important to distinguish between the obligations pertaining to results and the obligations pertaining to means. 11 The obligations pertaining to results (obligations de résultat) are the obligations whose fulfilment implies attainment of a specific goal in respect of which the obligation was created. In this type of obligations, the obligor is deemed to have fulfilled his duties only when specific results, on account of which the obligee entered the obligation relation, have been achieved. To the contrary, if the obligor fails to achieve such results in the course of his performance, he is deemed to have failed to fulfil his obligation, which results in implementation, by the obligee, of legal instruments envisaged in case of breach of obligation (in case of contracts -request for contract performance and contract cancellation), as well as the obligation to compensate the obligee for the damage. Most obligations fall within the group of obligations pertaining to results. Unlike the obligations pertaining to results, the obligations pertaining to means (obligations de moyens) are the obligations whose fulfilment does not necessarily imply attainment of the end result in respect of which the obligation was created. In this type of obligation, the obligor is deemed to have fulfilled its obligations if he has undertaken the promised action with due care, regardless of whether or not the results implied in the obligation 9 art. 18, Para. 2, law on Obligations 10 for more details see comments to art. 18, law on Obligations in [11, pp. 43-46] 11 For more details on this classification see [8, p. 90ff.] have been achieved, as far as the obligee is concerned (e.g. obligation on part of an intermediary to endeavour to find and connect with the principal a person with whom the principal can conclude a contract, obligation on part of a distributor to make his best efforts to improve the sale of goods of a certain manufacturer, etc). In performing his duties, the obligor is bound to act in good faith and with the care required by certain standards, however, he will not be held liable for damage if the action undertaken on behalf of the obligee has not produced the expected results. For these reasons, the contracts in modern business transactions 12 often contain clauses binding a party to make its best efforts, reasonable care, due diligence in order to perform the contractual obligation. 13 The key criterion in assessing whether or not the obligor has met the contractual obligation is precisely the assessment of the standard of due care, made by the court in each individual case in the light of all circumstances relevant to the given case. The above distinction between different types of obligations is of vast practical importance. In case of obligations pertaining to results, the obligee does not need to prove the obligor's fault in order to be entitled to damages; he has only to demonstrate that the contractual result has not been achieved by the other party. To the contrary, in case of obligations pertaining to means, the obligee must prove the obligor's fault in order to be entitled to damages; i.e. he must prove that the obligor, in a given case, failed to act with due care. 14 The type of care required of parties to an obligation relation is also important for assessing the degree of fault within the context of subjective liability for the damage caused. The subjective liability 15 is the liability for injury or loss based on the tortfeasor's fault. Law on Obligations provides that whoever causes injury or loss to another shall be liable to indemnify it, unless he can prove that the 12 for more details on modern commercial contracts not regulated by the law on Obligations see [6, pp.149-167] . 13 for more details on these clauses in international commercial contracts see [3, pp. 211-252 ]. 14 for more details see [7, p. 1293ff.] 15 See decision of the commercial appellate court, Pz 1253/2010 (2) dated 22 apr 2010 damage was caused through no fault of his own. 16 In this way, the Law has provided for a refutable assumption of fault in the area of non-contractual liability for damage, which means that the injured party does not have to prove the tortfeasor's fault, rather the burden of proof rests with the tortfeasor, who has to prove that the damage was caused through no fault of his own. Under the Law on Obligations, fault exists when the tortfeasor has caused injury or loss intentionally or through negligence (gross negligence and ordinary negligence).
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Intent (wilfulness), as the most serious degree of fault, exits in cases when the damage was caused intentionally, i.e. when the tortfeasor had the intention to cause injury or loss to another and, in general terms, when he acted in a way he was aware would harm another person. 18 In determining the existence of intent, the court applies the subjective criterion, establishing the tortfeasor's individual attributes and circumstances in each given case (in concreto assessment). On the other hand, gross negligence (culpa lata) exists when someone acts with utter negligence and carelessness, disregarding the basic requirements of care and prudence normally expected of a person. In other words, a grossly negligent person is one behaving with wanton recklessness and negligence, dismissing even elementary caution in his acts. In terms of liability for damage, gross negligence equals intent. The liability for intent or gross negligence may not be precluded in advance under a contract. 19 These types of fault are also provided in the Law on Obligations under the section defining the liability of legal entities for the damage caused by their officers or bodies, stipulating that a legal entity is liable for the damage its officers or bodies have caused to a third person in performing or in connection to performing their functions; in which case the legal entity is entitled to recover against the person being at fault for injury or loss inflicted wilfully or through gross negligence. 20 In the first place, the provisions defining the duty of care indicate that the Law has adopted the care of a prudent businessman as the general standard for assessing the care of a director [19, p. 131] . Also, the Law has further defined this type of care by specifying that this is the care that would be exercised by "a reasonably careful person if they had the knowledge, skills and experience that might reasonably be expected of a person performing particular functions in a company". 24 Inferring from certain aspects of the doctrine, the criterion for assessing this type of care is the manner in which an independent manager of a company would act, aware of his duties, who is not running his own business, but other people's assets and who has been entrusted with care for other people's property interests [1, p. 497] . The least required standard of conduct is that of a normally prudent businessman, and the director who fails to observe this minimum in his work cannot be exculpated [1, p. 497] . The assessment of this type of care is made in abstracto, which means that the characteristics and attributes of a particular director are not taken into account, and the applicable standard is that of objective care, i.e. what is usually expected of such person in the relevant area of business transactions.
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In addition to the care of prudent businessman as the standard for evaluating the care of director, the Law, by way of an exception, also provides for the care of a prudent expert. In cases when director has certain specific knowledge, skills or experience, such knowledge, skills and experience are also taken into account in evaluating the level of care. 26 This means that a director who has specific knowledge, skills or experience, is obligated to 24 art. 63, Para. 1 and 2, company law 25 the general rule about the implementation of standards of objective care, in the context of rules pertaining to the duties of a company director, may seem somewhat relativised, given that in some cases, the assessment of care requires taking his personal attributes and qualifications into account. this derives from the very provisions of the law concerning the duty of care, which draw a distinction between a case where the director is an expert ( art 63 Para 3) and the case where he does not have the required knowledge of the relevant field of business, (Art 63, Para 4). Furthermore, personal attributes must be taken into account within the context of general rules of the law on Obligations concerning the grading of fault from intent, gross negligence to ordinary negligence, given that the tortfeasor's individual attributes and circumstances are, as a rule, determined in each particular case when the existence of intent and gross negligence is evaluated [18, p.10]. 26 art. 63, Para 3, company law apply them. In this way, the Law has provided for a stricter, greater liability of a director who is at the same time an expert in the relevant field.
On the other hand, when director is not an expert in the field relevant to company operations, i.e. when he does not have the required knowledge and experience in the field relevant for taking a particular decision, he may hire appropriate experts, such as auditors, investment advisors, legal consultants, accountants, etc. Under such circumstances, the director is required to "reasonably believe that such persons have acted in good faith in a given case". 27 It is necessary to implement appropriate care in the selection of an expert, because otherwise, the issue of director's liability for the wrong choice could be raised (culpa in eligendo). Furthermore, in order to determine that in reaching his decision, a director acted "in good faith, with the care of a prudent businessman and in a reasonable belief that he is acting in the best interest of the company", the following questions need to be answered: 1) what information was required in the given case for reaching the decision; 2) to what extent such information needed to be acquired (elementary information about a certain issue, expert opinion, research, relevant analysis, etc); 3) at what time it needed to be acquired (e.g. can director base his decision on an opinion submitted by a consultant one year before the decision is taken 28 ). It seems that these and similar questions need to be addressed in the light of relevant circumstances of each particular case, whilst the court would be guided by the general principles of the Law on Obligations, as well as the rules of the Company Law bearing relevance to the issue of director's liability.
A director who has breached the duty of due care is liable for damages. It is a subjective liability, based on the assumption of fault under the above discussed general rules of the Law on Obligations. In terms of classification of obligations into the obligations pertaining to results and 27 art. 63, Para 4, company law 28 See decision of the higher court of the republic of Slovenia: VSl Judgement i cpg 510/2010 dated 16 Sep 2010, whereby director is bound to pay damages to the company (bank) in the amount of EUR 2,519,224.00 because he had granted a loan to an insolvent company. The court took the position that "by invoking the opinion of M.P. /the expert/… the accused may not be released of its liability also because such opinion was compiled more than two years prior to conclusion of the first draft loan agreement…" those pertaining to means, director's duty of care may be qualified as the obligation pertaining to means [16, p. 131] . In other words, the director, in the very nature of things, cannot guarantee achievement of success in the work he is undertaking; he is required, whilst acting on behalf of the company, to use his best efforts to achieve particular result, which in this case means that he has to act with the care of a prudent businessman, in good faith and in a reasonable belief that he is acting with the company's best interest in mind. Under the Company Law, the burden of proof rests with the director, and not with the company which has suffered damage. The director who proves that he has acted in compliance with Article 63 of this Law is released from the liability for damage.
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Once requirements for the existence of liability for damage are met, the injured party becomes entitled to damages. In general terms, damages consist of certain payment or actions which seek to remove the consequences of the loss the injured party has suffered, made at the expense of the person who had caused the loss. The purpose of such compensation is to restore the injured party to that position in which he or she would have been had the harmful event not occurred. 30 This means that damages must be equivalent to the loss suffered [14, p. 269] . The damages available to a company for the loss caused through operations of the director are generally governed by the rules of the Law on Obligations concerning the indemnity for damage to property, 31 with the exception of those issues that are specifically provided in the Company Law. With regard to the manner of indemnification of damage to property, the Law on Obligations provides for restitution to the previous condition and pecuniary compensation. Under the basic rules of the Law, the responsible person must restore the conditions existing prior to occurrence of damage. This allows for the principle of restoration in kind, which entails individual restitution (e.g. return of items unlawfully seized from the inured 29 art. 63, Para. 5, company law 30 this is non-contractual liability for damage. to the contrary, the purpose of damages available for breach of contract is to place the claimant in the same position as if the contract had been fully performed. for more details about the differences between contractual and tortious liability, see [7, p. 330ff.] 31 indemnity for damage to property is governed under articles 185-198 of the law on Obligations party), repair of the damaged item, as well as generic restitution performed by giving items of the same kind, quality and quantity as the items to be compensated. The choice of the method of indemnification will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, claims by the injured party and assessment of the court. However, compensation in kind is neither the only nor the primary method of indemnification; compensation will always be in cash when the injured party so demands, except where the circumstances of the particular case should justify restoration to the previous condition. Finally, a combination of the compensation in kind and pecuniary compensation is also possible, in cases where restoration to the previous condition does not remove the damage in full [7, p. 330ff.] . When the injured party is a company, the damage often consists of the loss of a certain pecuniary amount, and recovery of such amount is, as a rule, requested by way of indemnification. Exceptionally, where the damage consists of seizing, destroying or damaging an item, the company may claim individual or generic restitution, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
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As regards the scope of damages, the Law on Obligations provides that the injured party is entitled both to indemnity for actual damage and compensation for lost profit. The Law thus adopts the principle of full (integral) recovery, whereby recovery should equal the total damage caused. This principle is explicitly provided in the clause of the Law stipulating that the court, whilst also taking into account the circumstances after the occurrence of damage, shall determine damages in the amount necessary to restore the material state of the injured party into the condition it would have been had not the damaging act or omission occurred. The Law does not draw a distinction between the actual damage and lost profit depending on whether the tortfeasor caused the damage intentionally or through negligence.
33 By adopting the principle of integral recovery, the Law lays down the rule that the 32 For more details on indemnification of a company see [20, p. 121ff.] 33 in this regard, the position suggesting that so long as damage did not occur as a consequence of director's personal gain, the company is in principle entitled only to compensation of actual damage, however not lost profit, is contrary to the general principles of the Law on obligations. this position is held by a number of international theoreticians, and is present in one decision rendered by domestic courts. for more details see [20, p. 55ff.] injured party should be awarded full, complete recovery, regardless of the level of fault. In that regard, the level of fault involved in the tortfeasor's causing damage is quite irrelevant to the injured party; what matters to him is that the indemnification should fully cover the loss suffered as a result of the damage, i.e. that indemnification should equal the value of the damage caused [9] . However, the level of fault is not entirely irrelevant in this matter. Thus, the Law provides that the court may, whilst taking into account the material situation of the injured party, order the responsible person to pay an indemnity which is lower than the amount of the damage, provided that such damage was caused neither wilfully nor through gross negligence, where the responsible person is in straightened circumstances, so that the payment of full indemnity would reduce him to poverty. Furthermore, if the tortfeasor has caused damage whilst acting in the interest of the injured party, the court may order a lower indemnity, taking into account the degree of care the tortfeasor applies in his own affairs. Finally, in certain cases, the amount of indemnity may be affected by the injured party's conduct. In such cases, the liability is divided between the injured party and the tortfeasor. Under the Law, the injured party who has contributed to the occurrence of loss, or to loss being heavier than otherwise, is entitled only to a proportionally reduced indemnity. Where it is impossible to establish which part of loss arises from actions of the injured party, the court awards the indemnity taking into account the circumstances of the case.
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Compensation for damage becomes due from the moment the damage takes place, and the amount of compensation is determined according to the prices applicable at the time of the court decision. This rule applies both to indemnity for actual damage and compensation for lost profit. In assessing the lost profit, account is taken of the profit that was reasonably to be expected, based on the normal course of things or particular circumstances, but failed to be generated through the tortfeasor's acts or omissions. In determining the amount of damages based on the prices applicable at the time of the court decision, it is irrelevant whether such prices are higher or lower than those applicable 34 for more details on these rules from the standpoint of a company as the injured party see [20, pp. 122-124] at the time of the damage, and the reference to prices implies the current, everyday prices. 35 The arguments in favour of setting the time of court decision as one relevant for determining the amount of damages, underline that it offers the greatest guarantees for full compensation of damage, in view of frequent monetary changes resulting in reductions or increases of prices in the market [10, p. 52]. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Company Law provides for special deadlines for filing claims for damages on part of a company against the director who has breached the duty of care. In that regard, the provisions of the Company Law differ significantly from the general rules of the Law on Obligations on the statute of limitations for claiming damages. 36 Under the
Company Law, such claim may be filed within six months of becoming aware of the breach, however not later than five years upon the actual occurrence of such breach.
37

Duty to disclose personal interest
Legal actions and transactions where the company and its director appear concurrently as parties constitute business situations which require a set of legal rules of conduct for directors, to ensure that directors act in the interest of the company, rather than in their own personal interest.
The Company Law provides a broad definition of (direct and indirect) personal interest of the director, i.e. defines situations which involve the legal assumption of existence of director's personal interest. 38 director or a person affiliated with the director (e.g. filing or withdrawing a lawsuit against the director, waiver of a right enjoyed by the company, etc). The director's indirect personal interest is deemed to exist in cases when the company enters into a transaction or takes action (a) in relation to a third party who has a financial relationship with the director (or a person affiliated with the director) and such relationship can reasonably be expected to affect the director's actions, or (b) which would bring financial gain to a third party, if such third party has a financial relationship with the director (or a person affiliated with the director), which can reasonably be expected to affect the director's actions. In case of existence of (direct or indirect) personal interest, the director has the duty to notify such interest to the competent body of the company 40 . In compiling this notification, the director has to include a detailed description of the transaction (or action) undertaken and state the nature and extent of personal interest. 41 It is based on this notification that an approval of the transaction or action is granted. In limited liability companies, such decision is taken by the General Meeting by a simple majority of all shareholders, or by the Supervisory Board (in twotier management systems). In joint-stock companies, if the director has a personal interest, the authorisation is granted by a majority of votes of all disinterested (nonexecutive) directors 42 or by the Supervisory Board (in twotier management systems). When the authorisation is not granted by the General Meeting, it needs to be notified thereof and provided with a detailed description of the transaction (or action) and the nature of personal interest, at the first succeeding session.
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If transaction/action involving director's personal interest is not authorised, or if the authorisation was granted based on false or incomplete information, the company 40 competent bodies are: (i) the Board of directors or the general Meeting (in case of a company with a sole director) if a company has a one-tier management system, or (ii) the Supervisory Board, in two-tier management systems, art. 65. The penalties provided by the law include a fine or a prison sentence of up to 1 year, and if the damage incurred by the company exceeds rSd 10 million (ca. eur 87,000), the breach is punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 6 months and 5 years, and a fine. The court may also impose an injunction barring the offender from holding an office or pursuing a vocation in accordance with the criminal code (art. 582, company law). 49 germany has rich court practice with regard to public companies. thus, for example, a director of a public utilities company in germany was held liable for damages and was fired because he had paid training for his employees at a catering company, in case where (i) it was not clear that the training was expedient for the public utility company and (ii) director's de facto spouse enjoyed the free use of the pool given to her by that catering company at that time. 
Duty to avoid conflict of interest
The duty of loyalty to the company, in terms of conflict of interest between the director and the company, implies a duty on part of the director to avoid any cases that may involve a conflict between his own interests and those of the company [16, p. 133] . Under the broadly accepted principles of comparative legislation and business practice, direct breaches of the duty to avoid conflict of interest include [16, pp. 135-136 ]: 1) personal use of corporate opportunities; 2) appropriation of company assets in broad sense of the word; 3) obtaining benefits from third persons from company related transactions; 4) breach of prohibition of unjust enrichment; 5) use of privileged information; 6) abuse of position in the company. With this in mind, the Company Law provides explicit rules concerning the duty to avoid conflict of interest, envisaging that the director may not in his own interest or in the interest of persons affiliated to him 54 :
(i) use company's assets; (ii) use any information he may have obtained in the capacity of the director, insofar as 50 Principle 4, recommendation 2 of Kodeks korporativnog upravljanja [5] 51 law on Public companies provides that there has to be an independent member on the Supervisory Board of a public company (art. such information is not otherwise publicly available; (iii) abuse his position within the company; (iv) personally use opportunities for entering into transactions that arise for the company. 55 In case of a breach of this duty, the director is liable for damages, and the company may claim transfer of benefits gained by the director.
.56 Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether or not the company actually had the opportunity to use the assets or information or to enter into the transactions used by the director to his personal benefit. The claim for indemnification and transfer of benefits may be filed within six months of becoming aware of the breach, however not later than five years upon the actual occurrence of such breach. 57 One or more shareholders may bring derivative action on behalf of the company, if at the time of filing such action they held shares representing minimum 5% of the company's share capital. However, the director may be released of his liability if he can obtain prior or subsequent approval 58 from the competent body 59 . A director who breaches the duty to avoid conflict of interest with the intent of obtaining financial gain for himself or another person is subject to criminal liability.
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The Serbian law offers no special provisions governing this matter in respect of public companies, thus it remains an open issue how the above rules concerning the approvals related to the conflict of interest issues may apply to the directors of public companies. 55 art. 69, company law 56 for more details on this solution in Serbian law see reference [18] and [16, pp. 133-136] 57 art. 77, company law 58 art 70, company law 59 this is the same competent body which grants the approvals related to personal interest, see footnote 39 and footnote 40 60 The penalties provided by the law include a fine or a prison sentence of up to 1 year, and if the damage incurred by the company exceeds 10 million rSd (ca. eur 87,000), the breach is punishable by a term of imprisonment of between 6 months and 5 years, and a fine. The court may also impose an injunction barring the offender from holding an office or pursuing a vocation in accordance with the criminal code (art. 583, company law)
Duty of confidentiality
In business practice, the duty of confidentiality is usually provided under a contract, in confidentiality clause, whereby one or both parties to the contract undertake to keep confidential the information and data they have acquired through conclusion and execution of the contract, as well as in connection with the contract. Confidentiality clause has become not only common, but also a standard clause in contracts in business transactions. However, several issues are raised in the context of this clause, the most significant of which relate to: 1) defining the scope of the duty of confidentiality, 2) defining the duration of the duty of confidentiality, and 3) defining the sanctions in case of breach of the duty of confidentiality.
As regards the scope of the duty of confidentiality, the parties usually opt for a system defining in general terms the information deemed as confidential (e.g. "all commercial and technical information in relation to this Contract or in relation to the clients, business or affairs of the other Party"), whilst identifying the information which is not subject to confidentiality ("this restriction shall not apply to any information that is publicly available or required to be disclosed according to any law or regulation or binding regulation or judgement, order or requirement of any court or other competent authority") [4] .
The period of observing the duty of confidentiality is usually determined in the contract, in accordance with specific needs and interests of the parties. It may be limited in time ("until five years after X shall have completed the work provided for in article 9 of this Contract", "until four years after the start of commercial use of the Project", etc) or provisions can be made for the duty of confidentiality to apply indefinitely ("I shall not disclose any Confidential Information, both during my employment with the Company and at any time thereafter", "X shall, at all times during and after expiry or termination of this Agreement, keep secret and confidential...").
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In view of the general rules of the law on obligations concerning indemnification, the parties rarely make specific contractual provisions for sanctions in case of breach of the duty of confidentiality. Thus, some confidentiality 61 for more details see [3, p. 304ff.] clauses do not provide for any sanctions, some contain only a general definition of the existence of liability in case of breach of the confidentiality duty ("it is understood that you shall be responsible for any breach of these obligations by any of your officers, directors, employees or professional advisors"), while some clauses contain a precise definition of the duty of indemnification ("In the event of any breach of the secrecy provisions of this Contract, the party in breach shall indemnify the other party for any loss or damages..."). In this context, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is extremely difficult in practice to identify and prove the amount of damage suffered due to a breach of the confidentiality duty, which is why a lump sum to be paid out in damages may be anticipated under these clauses ("In the event that a party should commit a breach of his undertaking under this Article, he shall be liable to pay to the other party for each breach a penalty of ____USD ").
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As regards the legislation governing the duty of confidentiality in Serbia, the Law of Obligations does not contain specific rules on this duty, but it derives from the very principle of good faith and fairness, as one of the basic principles on which this Law is based. On the other hand, the Companies Law expressly provides for the duty of confidentiality within the rules governing special duties owed to the company.
Under the Companies Act, the duty of confidentiality applies to director, other persons with special duties, as well as company's employees. The law stipulates that these persons should owe the duty of confidentiality until two years upon expiry of their terms, whilst allowing for a longer term if so provided under the Memorandum of Association, Articles of Association, the decision of the company, or employment contract. However, the Law does not allow such term to exceed 5 years 63 , which means that any contractual clause providing for a longer or unlimited duration of this duty would be subject to the sanction of nullity. The Law defines the trade secret as "any information whose disclosure to a third party could cause damage to the company, as well as any information which may have economic value because it is not generally known and is not readily available to third parties who could gain economic benefit from its use or disclosure, and which is protected by the company with appropriate safeguards aimed at protecting the confidentiality. Information which is considered a trade secret can be production-related, technical, technological, financial or commercial information, a study, a research result, as well as a document, drawing, formula, object, method, procedure, notice or instruction of internal nature, etc. A trade secret is also any information defined as such under the law, other regulation or a company by-law. A company by-law may identify as trade secret only such information that complies with the requirements of the trade secret as provided in the Law. Furthermore, a company by-law may not define all information relating to the company's operations as trade secret.
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On the other hand, it is worth noting that disclosure of privileged information shall not be deemed as a breach of duty of confidentiality if such disclosure is: obligatory under the law; necessary to perform business operations or to protect the company interests; made to the competent authorities or general public with the sole purpose of calling attention to an offence punishable under the law. 65 The sanctions provided by the Law for a breach of the duty of confidentiality are: indemnification, expulsion from company, in case of a company member, termination of employment relation, in case of a company employee. 66 This action may be filed within six months of becoming aware of the breach of duty, however not later than five years upon the actual occurrence of such breach. 67 Prohibition of competition should seeks to preserve company's legitimate interests in terms of protection from director's unlawful conduct (positive interest), but should also seek to preserve director's economic freedom (negative interest) [16, p. 150] . Thus, the Memorandum of Association or Articles of Association may provide for an extension of non-compete duty even beyond the term in office as the director, however not longer than 2 years. Furthermore, the said company by-laws may also identify transactions, and the manner and place of their performance, which are not deemed to be a breach of the non-compete duty. If director is in employment relation with the company, the company is obliged to pay to the director certain pecuniary compensation for such extended period of noncompete duty 74 . This rule on payment of compensation to the director should be interpreted so as to apply also to director contracts not involving employment relation, in cases where a company by-law or director contract provide for an extension of non-compete duty for the director beyond expiry of the director's term in office. If a director breaches the non-compete duty, he shall be liable for damages, whilst the company may claim transfer of benefits gained by the director or the Competitor. The director may also be barred from pursuing a vocation and his employment relation (if any) may be terminated.
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This action may be filed within six months of becoming aware of the breach, however not later than five years upon the actual occurrence of such breach. 76 One or more shareholders may bring derivative action on behalf of the company, if at the time of filing such action they held shares representing minimum 5% of the company's share capital.
77
Serbian laws do not provide special regulations for this area in so far as public companies are concerned, thus, what has already been said in respect of the rules concerning public companies, applies, mutatis mutandis, to this area as well.
Conclusion
An examination of the rules provided in the Serbian law with regard to director's liability for damage caused to the company leads to the conclusion that the rules of the Companies Law governing this area cannot be viewed in isolation; their proper understanding and successful implementation require sound knowledge of all other relevant laws in this field, particularly the rules of the Law on Obligations and general principles of the obligations law. The general rules of the Law on Obligations are particularly relevant to the issue of assessment of director's With regard to public companies, the Serbian law does not provide specific rules on the liability of directors, but only general reference to appropriate application of the Companies Law. Given the differences in company bodies envisaged respectively by the Companies Law and the Law on Public Companies, this begs the question, left to the practice to address, of the body and the procedure that should grant approval to the director for certain legal transactions involving personal interest or conflict of interest between director and the public company, or in cases of prohibition of competition.
In view of the fact that Serbia has not yet developed significant court practice regarding the application of the rules on directors' liability for damage caused to the company, it is essential that legal solutions in this area should be carefully analysed from the aspect of legal doctrine, both in terms of domestic law and requirements of business practice and in terms of their comparison with the corresponding solutions of the comparative law. Given that the duties of care and loyalty should be seen as foremost strategies towards addressing the so-called first agency problem, i.e. the conflict between the shareholders and managers, a consistent interpretation of the rules related to these issues and a harmonised court practice whereby these rules are brought to life are key factors in achieving a higher degree of legal security in this area.
